Social Protection in ASEAN : Challenges and Initiatives for Post 2015 Vision by Asher, Mukul Govindji & Zen, Fauziah
 469C Bukit Timah Road 
Oei Tiong Ham Building 
Singapore 259772  
Tel: (65) 6516 6134  Fax: (65) 6778 1020 
Website: www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg 
 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 
Working Paper Series 
 
Social Protection in ASEAN: 




Mukul G Asher1 
Professorial Fellow 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 
National University of Singapore 






Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) 






January 28, 2015 
 










ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprising ten countries) is 
engaged in the task of framing Post 2015 vision for social protection in ASEAN 
which would facilitate productive ageing. This paper assesses existing social 
protection systems in ASEAN and suggests initiatives which the policymakers and 
other stakeholders could consider for progressing towards more robust social 
protection system. The paper argues that progressing towards the Post 2015 vision of 
social protection will require greater coordination between ASEAN’s economic and 
social sector groups, as weak social protection systems existing today will 
increasingly constrain future economic growth. ASEAN as a group will also need to 
substantially lessen its reliance on outside donors for funding and expertise. The 
specific initiatives suggested in the paper for facilitating productive ageing in ASEAN 
are: creating ASEAN social protection Forum for developing more robust databases, 
encouraging communication and indigenous research, and for rendering technical 
assistance to members; pursuing measures to reduce expenditure needs of the elderly, 
including well-designed discount system for public amenities and basic needs; giving 
greater priority to cross-border worker agreements to improve their living conditions, 





Key Words: ASEAN, Social Protection, Cross-border workers, Pensions, severance 
Payment, Workmen Compensation, Labour Market, Demographic trends 










1. Introduction  
 
ASEAN countries in the past have demonstrated high rates of economic 
growth, creating capacities to take advantage of demographic dividend offered by 
their young and growing populations. However, as ASEAN countries exhibit ageing 
populations at relatively lower per-capita income (Asher and Bali, 2015), and as they 
further integrate with the global community, they are not immune to structural 
challenges, including slower median term growth, and older and in some cases 
shrinking labour force. Rising longevity and falling fertility rates, along with 
urbanization, reduced family sizes and growing non-wage employment are expected 
to increase economic and societal insecurity, resulting in pressure on budgetary 
resources. Strong social security systems will thus be crucial in sustaining economic 
and political stability, and in ensuring social cohesion (Asher and Zen, 2013). This 
implies that ASEAN’s economic integration activities must be effectively co-
ordinated with its social sector initiatives. 
There also appears to be growing divergence among ASEAN member states in 
their economic and security orientation. Bhaskaran (2015) has argued that member 
states are placing greater emphasis on strategic bilateral ties over the multilateral 
engagements, including commitments as ASEAN members. This will be a challenge 
for ASEAN as an institution as it seeks progress towards its visions as a Community 
in economic, socio-cultural, security and other spheres. 
 Social protection is defined as preventing, managing, and overcoming 
situations that adversely affect people’s well-being2. They therefore consist of policies 
and programmes that are designed to reduce the incidence of poverty, limit the 
exposure of risks such as unemployment, sickness, disability, and smoothen 
consumption throughout the economic lifecycle. This is indeed a complex objective 
function and requires fiscal and administrative capacities, policy coordination across 
multiple sectors, and organizations. The above implies that social protection is not 






This papers main focus is on pensions or old-age income arrangements component of 
social protection3 . However other areas of social protection, such as healthcare, 
workmen compensations and severance/retrenchment benefits, are briefly discussed 
where appropriate.   
 The goal of any pension system should be to enable people in old age to obtain 
a bundle of services in a manner which is adequate, affordable by the society, and 
accessible. Countries use different financing-mix and differing methods of social and 
household risk pooling arrangements to enable the elderly to obtain retirement income 
for financing the bundle of services needed.  The above has been the case in ASEAN 
countries. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand thus, mostly rely on compulsory 
savings; Indonesia, Philippines, and Viet Nam have employed social insurance 
principles to organize their pension system.  
These programme-mixes or instrument-mixes reflect historical legacies, institutional 
choices, and country-specific administrative and fiscal capacities. ASEAN countries 
are heterogeneous in terms of level of economic development and economic 
structures, economic and institutional capacities, and in priority given to social 
protection goals. Thus no single blueprint is appropriate for organizing and reforming 
the pension system. Member countries will have to design their own reform path, 
including appropriate instrument-mix based on country-specific circumstances such 
as formality of labour markets, fiscal space to finance public pensions, 
professionalism of social protection organizations, and regulatory capacity to 
supervise social protection organizations, albeit guided by sound pension economics 
and policy principles and practices (Asher and Bali, 2015). 
 It is in the above context that the paper assesses the current pension system in 
ASEAN member countries in the context of the ASEAN vision on social protection, 
identifies challenges, and suggests specific initiatives meriting consideration. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the ASEAN 
vision on Social Protection and its implementation. The current status of social 






initiatives meriting consideration if progress towards social protection vision for 
ASEAN is to be attained. 
 
2. ASEAN Vision on Social Protection  
The ASEAN vision for Social Welfare and Protection is to “enhance  
the well being and livelihoods of the people of ASEAN through alleviating poverty, 
ensuring social welfare and protection, building a safe, secure and drug free 
environment, enhancing disaster resilience and addressing health development 
concerns” (ASEAN, 2009). There are seven elements to this: poverty alleviation, 
social safety nets and protection from negative impacts of integration and 
globalization, enhancing food security and safety, access to healthcare and promotion 
of healthy lifestyles, improved capability towards controlling communicable diseases, 
a drug-free ASEAN, and building disaster-resilient nations and safer communities 
(ASEAN, 2013). The notion of productive ageing is consistent with the above 
ASEAN vision. Productive ageing can be defined as focusing on public policies and 
private behavior to enable individuals to have a good quality life in old age (Asher, 
2014). 
ASEAN (2013) highlights that the implementation of the social protection 
vision was “satisfactory”, and that the initiatives implemented have been reviewed to 
have  “potential to improve quality of life through better social protection 
mechanisms institutionalized regional mechanism in addressing emerging infectious 
diseases; promotion of healthy lifestyles; adequate, accessible, affordable, and quality 
healthcare and services; access to adequate and safe food at all times and being better 
prepared to respond to pandemic diseases and disasters.” Table 1 highlights 
milestones recorded as sectoral and cross-sectoral achievements for social welfare and 
development, and health as reported in the mid-term assessment document (ASEAN, 
2013). 
Table 1: Elements and Milestones under Social Welfare and Protection  
Elements Milestones 
1. Poverty alleviation  Social Welfare and Development  
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2. Social safety net and 
protection from the 
negative impacts of 
integration and 
globalization  
3. Enhancing food security 
and safety  
4. Access to healthcare and 
promotion of 
healthy lifestyles  




6. Ensuring a drug-free 
ASEAN  
7. Building disaster-resilient 
nations and safer 
communities  
 
   2010: Establishment of the ASEAN 
Social Work Consortium (Dec 2008) with its Terms 
of Reference and Work Plan were then endorsed in 
Jan 2010  
   2010: Hanoi Declaration on the 
Enhancement of Welfare and Development of 
ASEAN Women and Children (May 10)  
   2011: Bali Declaration on the 
Enhancement of the Role and Participation of the 
Persons with Disabilities (Nov 11)  
   2011: ASEAN Decade of Persons with 
Disabilities (2011- 2020) (Nov 2011)  
   2012: Mobilisation Framework of the 
ASEAN Decade of Persons with Disabilities 
(2011-2012) (Sep 2012)  
 Health  
   2010: ASEAN Strategic Framework on 
Health Development for 2010-2015 (July 2010)  
   2010: Establishment of Regional 
Mechanisms in Responding to Emerging 
Infectious Diseases including: ASEAN Plus Three 
EID Website (2008), ASEAN Plus Three Field 
Epidemiology Training Network (2010); ASEAN 
Plus Three Partnership Laboratories (2010); 
ASEAN Risk Communication Centre (2010)  
   2010: Endorsement of ASEAN 
Strategic Framework on Health Development for 
2010 to 2015  
   2011: ASEAN Declaration of 
Commitment: Getting to Zero New HIV Infections, 
Zero Discrimination, Zero AIDS Related Deaths 
(Nov 2011)  
   2011: Launching of 15 June as ASEAN 
Dengue Day (15 June 2011 Jakarta, Indonesia) as 
endorsed by the 10thAHMM, July 2010)  
   2011: Policy on Smoke-free ASEAN 
Events (July 2011)  
   2011: ASEAN Position Paper on Non-
Communicable Diseases at the High Level 
Meeting on Non-Communicable Diseases: 
Prevention and Control, UN General Assembly, 
September 2011, New York  
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   2011: Four new Task Forces: 
Traditional Medicine, Mental Health, Non-
Communicable Diseases, Maternal and Child Health 
   2012: ASEAN Health Publications: 
ASEAN Health Profile; ASEAN Tobacco Control 
Report; ASEAN E-Health Bulletins  
   2012: Signed Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Governments of the 
Member States of The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China on Health Cooperation 
(6 July 2012, Phuket - Thailand)  
   2012: Establishment of ASEAN Plus 
Three Universal Health Coverage (UHC) Network 
(11 - 12 December 2012, Bangkok - Thailand)  
   2012: Declaration of the 7th East Asia 
Summit on Regional Responses to Malaria Control 
and Addressing Resistance to Antimalarial 
Medicines Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 20 November 
2012  
   2012: Nomination of 13 sites for the 
ASEAN Cities Getting to Zeros Project in eight (8) 
ASEAN Member States  
2013: Four (4) ASEAN Focal Points on 
Tobacco Control (AFPTC) Recommendations and 
One (1) Endorsed Sharing Mechanism of Pictorial 
Health Warning. The four (4) Recommendations 
namely: 1) AFPTC Recommendations on Providing 
Protection from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke; 2) 
AFTPC Recommendations on Protecting Public 
Health Policy with Respect to Tobacco Control 
Industry Interference; 3) AFPTC Recommendations 
on Price and Tax Measures to Reduce the Demand 
for Tobacco Products; 4) AFPTC 
Recommendations on Banning Tobacco 
Advertising, Promotion, and Sponsorship (TAPS) 
(May 2013) 
Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on Non- 
communicable Diseases in ASEAN endorsement at 
the 8th SOMHD Meeting. (August 2013) 
Source: Mid-Term Review of theASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, ASEAN Report 
(2013). 
It is important to underscore the variation in progress made in achieving the 
ASEAN vision across member countries. This is due to vast differences in fiscal and 
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administrative capacities, and policy priorities given to social protection in the scale 
of aged people in various ASEAN countries. For instance, Indonesia has to provide 
old-age income security for 33.9 million people by 2030, but Singapore has to cater to 
1.6 million individuals above the age of 65 (Table 2).  
3. Current Status of Social Protection in ASEAN 
Current demographic trends suggest that most economies in ASEAN will age 
at relatively low incomes, and at a pace that will allow a smaller window of 
opportunity in terms of time for adjustments in the design of pension programmes and 
reforming institutions that support social protection systems.  Pension systems will 
have to finance retirement expenditure for an ageing population for a longer duration, 
and will therefore have to increase the share of society’s resources devoted to the 
elderly. Additional funding will require changes in the financing-mix used to provide 
pensions in these countries4 (Asher and Bali, 2015). 
Table 2: Demographic trends for select ASEAN countries  
 Population (millions) Share of Pop >65 (share in total 
population) 
Share of Pop >80 (share in total 
population) 
 2010 2035 2010 2035 2010 2035 
Brunei 
Darussalam 




























































4 Funding refers to a proportion or a share of the total economic resources available to meet age-related spending. 
This will necessarily imply trade-offs with competing public and private expenditure priorities. Financing refers to 
the various instruments or mechanisms through which resources are accessed or allocated. These include for 
example social insurance contributions, mandatory and voluntary savings, general budgetary revenue, family and 
community support, and others.  
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Source: Compiled from the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of 
the United Nations Secretariat, http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp .; and Asher and Bali (2015) 
Even in a relatively confined geographical area of ASEAN there is significant 
variation in total population and the level and pace of ageing.  The total population in 
most economies except Thailand and Brunei Darrussalam are projected to increase 
significantly over the next two decades. Data in Table 2 portends a very rapid pace of 
ageing. This share is projected to more than double in most economies (except 
Philippines and Lao) over the next two decades. This is a relatively short period of 
time to ensure adequately preparing for the ageing population. The data also suggests 
different scaling-up challenges across these economies. For instance, Singapore and 
Malaysia’s pension arrangements will have to cater for between 1 and 3 million 
additional individuals entering retirement; Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam 
between 5 and 10 million; and Indonesia about 20 million.  This suggests that there is 
relatively small window for reform in not only pension design to adapt to rapid 
ageing, but also in supporting institutions such as labour markets and in public 
financial management practices.  The last two columns depict the share of those aged 
about 80 in the population. These shares will also more than double in most 
economies, with the exception of Indonesia, Lao, and Viet Nam. The consumption 
patterns of those about age 80 can be expected to differ significantly from those at age 
65.  This suggests that adequate infrastructure to take care of the old-old (traditionally 
defined as those above age 80) such as health and palliative care will need to be 
developed rapidly.  
Table 3: Employment and Labour Force Participation Rates (LFPR)  
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 LFPR  (15-64) in 
2010 
LFPR (65+) in 
2010 
Change in LFPR 
(15-64) from 
2010 -2020 
Change in LFPR 
(65+) from 2010-
2020 






Brunei 70.3 4.3 0.1 -1.9 -4.0 
Cambodia 81.3 44 0.5 0.9 2.0 
Indonesia 70.4 52.7 0.3 1.7 2.5 
Lao 80.9 34.6 1.1 2 8.0 
Malaysia 64.7 23.8 -0.7 0.4 0.6 
Myanmar 74.8 60 0.9 -0.1 1.5 
Philippines 66.1 37.4 -0.2 -2.4 4.1 
Singapore 71.5 18 1.6 2.0 -10.3 
Thailand 77.8 30.6 0.1 1.0 -8.0 
Viet Nam 77.9 13 0.0 -1.3 -1.5 
World  69.9 19.5 1.0 0.4 -1.2 
Source: Complied from United Nations Secretariat and ILO (2010), and Asher and Bali (2015) 
Table 3 presents labour market trends. Greater lifecycle labour supply enables 
individuals to sustain (for given trade-off) higher annual consumption during 
retirement. Theories of economic growth assume a strong role of employment in 
driving increased savings and investment, and contribution to the demographic 
dividend.  While not illustrated in the table, in most economies labour force 
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participation rates (LFPR)5 for men is higher than for women. If pension programmes 
are designed on principles of commercial insurance and not on social insurance or 
solidarity principles, such trends will give rise to lower replacement rates6 for women 
and inequity within the pension system.  This is because women (as a group) have 
lower lifecycle labour supply and lower incomes and therefore lower resources, but 
(as a group) live longer than men and will have to finance retirement spending for a 
longer period. The LFPR numbers also mask trends between rural and urban areas. In 
developing economies of Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam it is a 
reasonable assumption to make that improved access to basic amenities such as water, 
electricity and sanitation will improve LFPR, in turn helping to plan for retirement 
savings.  
In most economies in Table 3 the gains in LFPR both for age groups 15-64 
and above 65 will be marginal over the next decade. Philippines and Viet Nam are 
expected to experience a reduction in LFPR for those above age 65. The last column 
in Table 3 is particularly relevant for pension systems. The share of economically 
active (i.e. those between 15-64 years) is expected to decline for Singapore, Thailand 
and Viet Nam, grow marginally for Indonesia and Malaysia and significantly for 
Philippines over the next decade. When this is viewed in the context of data presented 
in Table 2 it suggests that a smaller number of individuals can be part of the labour 
force and potentially employed to support the elderly population. While this share is a 
function of mortality and fertility rates and cannot be adjusted in the medium term, 
the policy goal is to improve sustainable livelihoods or gainful employment for the 
vast majority of those in the economically active age group so that the elderly 
population can be supported for a longer period of time. This would require 
separating institutional retirement age which often difficult to alter, from 
economically active retirement age which is subject to policy initiatives such as 
exempting persons above a certain age from contributing to provident or pension 
programs. 
                                                            
5 Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population aged 15 years and older that is economically 
active.   
6 A replacement rate is the share of income during retirement from all sources (including personal savings, pension 
income, family, government transfers, property income,etc.) relative to an individuals salary prior to retirement. 
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 The above demographic trends suggest that greater funding. i.e. higher 
proportion of GDP, will have to be made available to meet old-age expenditure needs.  
With increasing longevity, current age-specific contributions by individuals and 
households to national savings, consumption, and investment may change. As 
individuals will have to sustain consumption for a longer period of time, without 
transfers, this will have to be balanced with participation in the labour market for a 
longer period of time, or through higher savings, or reduced levels of current 
consumption, or a combination of the above (Poterba, 2014).  
The data presented in this section suggests that there will be marginal improvements 
over the next decade in labour force participation in both the economically active age 
groups and those above age 65, and therefore greater funding through transfers, 
particularly from the state, will play an important role providing old-age income 
security to economies in ASEAN.  
 There are three broad dimensions to coverage. The first refers to the number 
of people or retirees that are enrolled in a programme that provides some form of 
insurance against various risks during old age. The second refers to the range of risks 
covered. In pensions these usually include longevity, survivors’, and disability risks. 
The third dimension of pension coverage refers to the adequacy of pension benefits in 
providing a replacement rate that not only covers inflation risks and mitigates old-age 
income poverty, but also helps to prevent too large a fluctuation in consumption level 
over life-time. 
Table 4: Legal and Effective Coverage of Pensions and Healthcare Programmes  
 Estimate of 
Health 
Coverage as a 




financed by OOP 
spending (2011) 
Estimate of Legal 
Coverage for Old 




Contributors to a 
Pension Scheme 









Indonesia 59.0 50.1 <25 14.1 8.1 
Malaysia 100.0 64.6 NA 63.8 19.8 
Philippines 82.0 44.1 50-75 54.7 28.5 
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Singapore 100.0 39.6 50-75 NA NA 
Thailand 98.0 86.5 50-75 21.3 81.7a  
Viet Nam 42.0 43.9 <25 12.4 34.5 
a These proportions refer only to beneficiaries of the old-age or disability social pensions. NA= not available. 
Source: Asher and Bali (2015) 
In ASEAN countries coverage is mostly focused on increasing the number of 
individuals that are ‘covered’ under a statutory programme and the range of risks 
covered. This is commonly referred to as legal coverage. The data in Table 4 suggests 
that there is universal legal healthcare coverage in all economies except Indonesia and 
Viet Nam, however these programmes do not provide adequate benefit levels as most 
of healthcare spending is financed out of pocket (except in Thailand). This will reduce 
the real value of pension benefits, as retirees will have to draw down their pension 
balances to pay for healthcare. For pension programmes, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand have between half and three-fourths of the current working age population 
covered by social security laws, while the ratio is much smaller for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Viet Nam. However, there is wide variation in the active contributors 
to the pension programme. In most direct contribution-type pension programmes the 
density of contributions is important to ensure adequate replacement rates. The share 
of active contributors is much lower than those covered by the programme. The last 
column in Table 4 is the share of elderly population that receives pensions, again 
demonstrates large variation. It is very high in Thailand, but less than 40 per cent in 
other ASEAN economies. This suggests that there is considerable scope to improve 
effective coverage. Given the low effective coverage, this suggests that significant 
shares of retirement expenditure and healthcare expenditure will have to be financed 
from individual and household savings. Improvements in organizational effectiveness 
and coverage ratios of public pension schemes are an urgent imperative in economies 
such as Indonesia, Philippines and Viet Nam.  
The above analysis suggests that the challenge for ASEAN countries is to 
substantially increase the effective coverage of social protection programmes, 
particularly pensions, healthcare, and work injury or workmen compensation both in 
terms of population and coverage of workers of various risks. A related challenge is to 
improve benefit levels under each of these programmes.  
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Workmen’s Compensation and Severance Pay 
This area of social protection has received relatively little attention of the 
policymakers and researchers, but it merits greater importance in social protection 
arrangements.  Workmen’s compensation is defined as “social insurance, which in 
effect extends the no-fault principle to share the costs of employment injury across 
society (or at least that part represented in the formal labour market) as a whole. 
Underpinning this approach is the principle that employers must provide their workers 
with a safe and healthy working environment, and that failure to do so renders them 
liable for the consequent losses suffered by workers or their family members,” (ILO, 
2014, p.46). Severance pay is defined as “form of income protection available to 
workers dis- missed from certain forms of formal employment.” It is a “lump-sum 
payment to laid-off workers proportionate to their prior job tenure”, (ILO, 2014, 
p.32).  
The extent to which the actual burden of all social protection programs is 
distributed between workers, employers, government, and other stakeholders can only 
be ascertained with economic analysis incorporating behavioural adjustments by each 
of the economic agents in response to specific social protection programs, and not 
apriori. The notion of Cost-to- Company (CTC) in determining remuneration levels is 
consistent with this proposition. Empirical analysis of the actual economic burden of 
social protection programs in ASEAN merits serious consideration.  
It should also be stressed that along with pensions these two social protection 
programmes constitute the cost of hiring and retrenching labour. Thus for all social 
protection programmes– costs to the employers, to society, and to the workers of all 
social protection programmes, should be considered together. Thus, Guérard (2012) 
has argued that Indonesia’s severance pay and long service leave benefits 
substantially increase employer cost without commensurate benefits to the workers. 
As may be expected, practices regarding this area of social protection in ASEAN 
countries vary.  
Table 5: Generosity of Severance Payments and Length of Service in Sample 
Countries  
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 Length of service    
Countries  9 months (1)  4 years 
(2)  
20 years (3)  3/1 (4)  3/2 (5)  
Indiaa  12 days (approx.)  2 months  10 months  25 5 
Malaysia  8 days (approx.)  2 months  13.5 months  45 6.8 
Philippines  1 month  2 months  10 months  10 5 
Singaporeb  12 days (approx.)  4 months  20 months  50 5 
Sri Lankac  1.7 months (approx.)  9 months  46 months  27.1 5.1 
Thailandd  1 month  6 months  10 months  10 1.7 
Notes:a These refer to retrenchment benefits. The “layoff” benefits are different. For firms employing more than 50 workers 
the layoff compensation is at the rate of 50 percent of the basic pay plus dearness allowance. This is in addition to the worker’s 
wages during the layoff period. This applies for those who have been employed for one year or more. For firm employing less 
than 50 workers, only the wages need to be paid.; b Severance payments are not mandatory in Singapore. The figures used are 
based on recent retrenchment exercises in large companies; c While the severance payments are mandatory, the benefit level is 
not indicated in the Act but is at the discretion of the Labor Commissioner. The figures in the table indicate an average awards 
for year 2000 and 2001. These levels therefore may not represent other years; d In Thailand, if the employer terminates the 
employment contract due to adoption of new labor- saving technologies, the employer must make a special severance payment, 
in addition to the normal severance payment, to employees serving the firm for more than six years. The benefit is calculated at 
the rate of half a month’s wages per year of service with a cap of 12 months wages.  In the event that the employer relocates its 
place of business that essentially affects normal living of the employee or his/her family, the employer must notify the employee 
of the relocation at least 30 days in advance or pay an amount in lieu of the advance notice equal to 30 days’ wages. In this 
connection, if the employee refuses to move and work in new location, the employee has the right to terminate the employment 
contract and is entitled to receive a special severance pay of not less than 50 per cent of the prescribed rates of severance pay. 
Source: Asher and Mukhopadhaya (2004). 
 
 
 Table 5 highlights the range of severance payments across countries. Sri Lanka 
stands out as having the most generous severance payments benefits among the 
sample countries for all three cases of length of service. Sri Lanka’s severance 
payment of 46 months (for 20 years of service) is nearly three and a half times that of 
Malaysia, and four and a half times that of Philippines, and Thailand. For workers 
with 20 years of service, Malaysia’s benefits of 13.5 months of salary are moderately 
higher than the 10 months level by Philippines and Thailand. Singapore’s benefits 
levels at 20 months are substantially higher but not mandatory. Comparatively benefit 
levels for 20 years of service (as multiple of 9 months of service) are substantially 
higher in Malaysia and Singapore than in other countries (Asher and Mukhopadhaya, 
2004). Asher and Mukhopadhaya (2004) have argued that there is greater consistency 
between severance pay and other systems and the growth strategy in Malaysia and 
Singapore. While this has enabled emphasis on job creation it has also had adversely 
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impacted on labour rights and jobs protection.  
 There are two additional areas that merit a separate discussion in social 
protection. These are cross-border workers and social protection floor. 
Cross-Border Workers 
The ASEAN is an open region has a stake in cross-border flows of workers. Open 
region, with both receiving and sending countries as ASEAN members.   The intra-
ASEAN flow of migrants has been steadily increasing from 1.5 million to 6.5 million 
from 1990 to 2013 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Intra-ASEAN share of Member States total migrant stocks 
 
Source: ILO and ADB (2014), p.84. 
 
The key destinations for intra-ASEAN migration are Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, accounting for 97 per cent of intra-ASEAN migration. For Singapore this 
accounts to 52.9 per cent, for Malaysia 61.2 per cent, and for Thailand 96.2 per cent. 
Intra-ASEAN migrant from countries of origin has also increased from Myanmar, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Cambodia by around 40 percentage points 
each in terms of their total nationals abroad. Most intra- ASEAN migrant workers are 
employed in low and medium-skills jobs, such as domestic work, construction, 
agriculture, and fishing sectors (ILO and ADB, 2014; Baruah, 2013). 
Given the large flows of migrant labour in AEC, member countries receive 
significant remittances from foreign workers. The remittances, as share of GDP, 
ranged between 0.4 and 9.8 per cent (Table 6). In countries such as the Philippines 
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and Viet Nam remittances by foreign workers are approximately equivalent to 
government expenditure on healthcare and pension programmes.  
Table 6: Migrant Remittances Inflow for ASEAN, Selected Years (US $ million) 
 1990 2000 2010 2013 Remittances as a 
share of GDP in 
2013 (%)  
Brunei Darussalam NA NA NA NA NA 
Cambodia NA 121 153 176 1.2 
Indonesia 166 1190 6916 7615 0.9 
Lao 11 1 42 59 0.5 
Malaysia 185 342 1103 1396 0.4 
Myanmar 6 102 115 566 NA 
Philippines 1462 6957 21557 26700 9.8 
Singapore NA NA NA NA NA 
Thailand 973 1700 3580 5690 1.5 
Viet Nam NA NA 8620 11000 6.4 
Total  2803 10413 42086 53202 NA 
Note: All numbers are in current (nominal) US $. NA= not available. Source: Annual Remittances 
Data, The World Bank, Various Years.  
 
The provisions concerning the social protection services, particularly 
healthcare and workmen compensation for foreign workers varies across AEC (Figure 
2). For instance, foreign workers in Thailand can access the public healthcare systems 
at similar costs as citizens, but not so in Singapore. Foreign workers in ASEAN 
working in the manufacturing and construction sector have limited access to workman 
compensation. The recipient’s countries, particularly Singapore and Brunei, receive 




Figure 2: Coverage of migrant workers under social security by country and branch, 
2014 
 
Source: ILO and ADB (2014),p.98. 
Different member states also impose varying constraints that may restrict such 
movement. These constraints come in forms of levies, permits, and quotas7. It is 
unclear as of January 2015 whether the AEC post-2015 arrangements will continue to 
permit such high levies on foreign workers. It is also unclear at this point whether the 
ASEAN countries would use such levies to constraint the flow of professional 
workers among ASEAN countries. ASEAN policymakers are reportedly discussing a 











document has emerged. In 2007, ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers was signed to ensure migrant worker 
rights for both sending and receiving countries (ASEAN, 2007).  
If AEC is to be coherent economic community it is essential that the flow of 
workers within ASEAN is managed in a manner consistent with the overall interest of 
the AEC, rather than each country trying to maximum their own interests. Labour 
laws and management of regional flow is and will be a critical challenge for ASEAN 
to overcome. As these economies continue to grow need for labour will only increase, 
with most demand likely to be met from within the region. Hence, governments must 
progress towards easing constraints for such flows, and enact legislation to ensure 
proper working and living conditions for migrant workers. Social protection, 
involving access to basic health and other services in their country of work, and 
labour rights will be need to be a key focus for the AEC. This highlights the 
importance of building a social protection floor. 
Social Protection Floor –The role of Social Pensions 
The second challenge for strengthening social protection refers the importance 
of building a Social Protection Floor (SPF) in the AEC, but in a context specific and 
gradual basis, without making formal commitments as it will increase demand 
immediately, but supply of services take much longer, and be subject to various 
constraints, creating distortions and unduly raise expectations. The implications of 
SPF on fiscal demands which are likely to be less predictable due to potential for 
political economy environment leading to growing benefit levels, and due to future 
inflation risk in these services being borne by the government. The opportunity costs 
of SPF in terms of other expenditure priorities such as education, and infrastructure, 
can also be better managed if the SPF is not mandatorily established through 
legislation. 
There is however increasing recognition of the role of social pensions, i.e. 
non-contributory retirement income benefits that are financed form budgetary 
sources, in mitigating old age income poverty and ensuring that inequalities present 
during the working age are not aggravated during the retirement period.  But this 
should also be calibrated in line with capacity to deliver social pensions with low 
transaction costs, and without unduly large errors of inclusion (i.e. those who should 
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not receive the benefit do), and of exclusion (those who should receive the benefit are 
not). 
The UN’s 2015 “Road to Dignity” report also stresses the need for countries to 
increase domestic public revenue to develop core social functions as such the SPF.” 
The report highlights “key sustainable development gaps left by the MDGs” such as 
social protection and labour rights (p.14). 
Table 7 provides an overview of the main features of social pension schemes 
in the selected ASEAN countries. 
Table 7: Non-Contributory Pension Schemes: Main Features (latest available year)  
 
Source: Asher and Bali, 2015. 
All economies except Singapore have some element of social pensions in their 
financing-mix. However, there is large variation in the number of beneficiaries and 
the benefit level. While the benefit level (as share of average wage) is relatively low 
in Thailand, all individuals above age 60 receive social pension. Indonesia’s social 









above age 65) 
Indonesia 2006 Asset, Income, 
Pensions 
Elderly Social Security 
Programme  
60 32.0 (23.2) 13250 (0.1) 
Malaysia 1982 Income, Pensions Elderly Assistance Scheme 60 94.4 (12.7) 15252 (8.0) 
Philippines 2011 Income, Pensions Social Pensions Scheme  
 
77 11.5 (6.0) 148768 (4.0) 
Singapore Singapore does not have a social pension 
Thailand 1993 Income, Pensions Old Age Allowance 60 20.0 (6.0) 612370 
 (100%) 
Viet Nam 2004 Income, Pensions Social Assistance Benefit  
 
60 -79 






pension is approximately a fourth of wages, but less than 0.1 per cent of the 
population above age 65 receive it. Singapore does not have a social pension scheme. 
The data suggests that there is room to develop social pensions as an integral 
component in the financing-mix to support retirement. Social pensions would provide 
an element of retirement security to those that have not been able to participate in 
formal contributions-based social security programmes.  
 How much would social pension schemes cost? Estimates in a recent paper on 
financing social pensions in developing Asia (which included most economies in 
ASEAN except Singapore) suggests that a universal social pension (covering 
everyone over age that is indexed to per capita income (i.e. benefit level is 15 per cent 
of per capita income) would cost between 0.6 per cent (Philippines) and 1.33 per cent 
(Thailand) of GDP in 2010 and rapidly growing to between 1.4 per cent (Indonesia) 
and 2.9 per cent (Thailand) by 20308.  
In advanced economies such as New Zealand, fiscal costs in 2009–10 were 4.3 per 
cent of GDP and are expected to increase to 8 per cent of GDP by 2050; in Australia, 
the fiscal costs of means-tested pensions were 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2009, and are 
projected to be 3.9 per cent of GDP in 2050 (Bateman & Piggott, 2011). For 
Singapore, Asher and Bali (2014) estimate that for a benefit level of 30 per cent of 
median annual wage, the fiscal cost will range from about 1.16 per cent of GDP in 
2012 to 2.60 per cent by 2030 (for a universal social pension for all citizens above age 
65). If the benefit level is indexed to 20 per cent per capita income, the estimate cost 
of the social pension scheme will range between 1.26 per cent in 2012 to 3.46 per cent 
in 2030.  
























Public Debt to 
GDP in 2014 ( 
percentage point 
increase over 
past three years)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 
                                                            
8 See (M. G. Asher & Bali, 2014, p. 77)  
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Indonesia Central 17.4 17.4 17.4 12.1 5.3 N -0.9 25.5 (1.2) 
Malaysia Central 20.8 20.8 20.8 14.6 6.2 N -4.3 62.3 (8.9) 
Philippines Central 14.8 14.8 14.5 12.9 1.6 0.3 -2 47.4 (-3.8) 
Singapore Central 21.9 21.9 18.4 12.7 5.7 3.5 6.8 94.3 (-4.8) 
Thailand Central 16.9 16.9 16.9 14.9 2.0 N -1.4 53.1 (8.6) 
Viet Nam Central 28.5 28.1 25.9 23.6 2.4 2.1 -1.6 47.3 (-5.1) 
Note: Columns 3-5, and 7 are as per cent of GDP. Column 6 is as per cent of current revenue tax. N= 
negligible. Source: Das-Gupta (2014) and Economist Intelligence Unit  
 
The above fiscal cost of social pensions should be weighed against the 
resource position of ASEAN countries. Thus, Indonesia’s tax to GDP ratio was 12.1 
per cent during 2005-2011. The projected social pension cost of 1.4 per cent of 
Indonesia will be one-eights of its total tax revenue. This requires significantly large 
tax mobilization efforts. Moreover there are other claimants for any revenue increase 
whose merits will need to be weighed against merits of social pensions. Social 
pensions will have an opportunity cost in terms of other expenditure not being given a 
priority.  
 
5.  ASEAN Social Protection Vision: Suggested Initiatives  
The issue of whether to create a social protection forum at AEC level for 
technical and other assistance is an issue which merits serious consideration.  It is 
essential that ASEAN as a group create mechanisms and modalities whereby 
individual countries can be supported in their reform efforts. This is to ensure that all 
ASEAN countries are able to construct minimum social protection capabilities and 
support systems. This requires ASEAN to put much greater weight on the social 
protection agenda in its functioning then has been the case until now.    
To be a coherent Economic Community it is essential that the flow of workers 
within AEC are managed in a manner consistent with the overall interest of the AEC, 
rather than each country trying to maximum their own interests. In analysing labour 
migration, Holzman and Koettl (2014) have argued that “… legal and human rights 
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based considerations are increasingly joined by economic considerations that help 
underpin the social policy objectives with a more analytical and empirical 
framework”. They propose a framework for analysing portability of pension and 
health benefits across borders which incorporates risk pooling, pre-funding, and 
redistribution to improve efficiency and fairness. Such a framework can be used both 
as a substitute and compliment to totalization agreements. 
 
The vision should have as its outcome in enabling the elderly in all ASEAN 
countries to pursue productive ageing. Productive ageing can be defined as focusing 
on public policies and private behaviour to enable individuals to have a good quality 
life in old age (Asher, 2014). The role of ASEAN as an institution is to enable 
individual members to plan and develop capacities for taking initiatives towards 
realising productive ageing of its population merits consideration. Planning must be 
outcome based. This implies that outcomes be clearly stated, compared to the current 
situation and roadmap, in as concrete initiatives as possible, and achieved within a 
stated timeframe. It is not just about funds allocation, but producing desired 
outcomes, in terms of creating a bundle of services, which the elder population can 
access and afford. The rest of this section enumerates some of the initiatives to enable 
pursuit of productive ageing in ASEAN: 
1. Reducing expenditure needs 
Policies conducive to productive ageing facilitate following avenues for 
reducing the expenditure needs. First, they could lead to better understanding the 
underlying reasons for certain diseases more prevalent in the elderly, reducing their 
incidence and treatment costs.  
 
Second, they could assist in keeping individuals economically (and socially) 
active for a longer period. Increasing the effective retirement age9 has been one of the 
significant policy responses in Europe, U.S., Japan, Singapore, and the U.K. Other 
Asian countries, most notably China, India and Indonesia, may also consider reforms 
designed to increase effective retirement age to reduce the number of years for which 
financing is needed in old age. Facilitating  gradual rather than abrupt shift from full 
time work to retirement also merits serious consideration.  
                                                            
9 This is usually lower than the institutional or statutory retirement age.  
24 
 
Third, awareness of productive ageing facilitates more informed debates about 
ageing and equitable sharing of resources and amenities between generations. This is 
an area where ILCs are playing a vital role. The state also has a responsibility to 
initiate high quality expertise and empirical-evidence based debate among all the 
stakeholders. 
Fourth, a well-considered system of discounts for public amenities such as for 
transport services, utilities, museums and parks, etc. could help reduce expenditure 
needs of the elderly. Having public spaces in community centres etc for the elderly 
could provide low cost safe places for the elderly to gather and exchange information. 
 
Fourth, Social Security needs of increasing number of cross border workers 
also need to be addressed. Officially recorded remittance flows to developing 
countries reached an estimated $401 billion in 2012, growing by 5.3 per cent 
compared with 2011. Remittance flows are expected to grow at an average of 8.8 per 
cent annual rate during 2013-2015 to about $515 billion in 2015. Stock of immigrants 
is projected to increase from about 216 million in 2010 to 400 million by 2040 
(Sutherland, 2013).  
Cross border workers provide vital economic services and fiscal benefits to the 
receiving community, but often do not receive commensurate public services. This 
issue serves to be addressed in individual countries, and by ASEAN as a group.  
 
2. Creating Fiscal Space: 
 Avenues to generate resource savings and fiscal space, and finance for funding 
expenditure on the aged are briefly noted below. 
 There is considerable scope for economic resource savings, which can be 
obtained through increased professionalism in the design, administration and 
structure of provident and pension funds, and health care systems, among 
others. The Philippines SSS (Social security system), for example, exhibits 
administrative costs of around 7 per cent of contributions, while the estimate 
for Malaysia’s EPF (Employee Provident Fund) is around 3 per cent. A 
reduction in costs of the SSS through process and system reforms could thus 
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improve benefits. The SJSN Law of Indonesia (2004) has insufficient clarity 
on financing, benefits etc., and does not adequately address the need for 
appropriate organizational incentive structures. This neglect may generate 
contingent fiscal liabilities. Skypala (2014) has argued that separating charges 
for fund investments and for administration by pension fund managers could 
reduce pension management costs in the UK, thus improving benefits.  There 
is a strong case for exploring various avenues for reducing administration and 
compliance costs of pension and health care programs. 
 Enhancing competence to generate resources from unconventional sources 
such as utilizing state assets (land, property rights such as air-space, oil and 
mining resources, and carbon trading, among others) efficiently. This is likely 
to involve better coordination among and between pension and healthcare 
sectors for increased resource savings and greater policy coherence (Bali and 
Asher, 2012). 
 Conventional tax reforms, and improving compliance levels and efficiency. In 
Europe, US, and the U.K, corporate tax reforms, particularly those provisions 
designed to protect the tax base have become a priority. The aggressive 
corporate tax planning is exemplified by reports that Google shifted € 9 
Billion to Bermuda as part of its global tax planning (Houlder, 2013.) In 2012, 
OECD created a forum on VAT (Value Added Tax) to help counter aggressive 
tax planning of VAT by the businesses.  
 Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs); set up to smoothen excess of current 
receipts over expenditure arising from energy resources, trade surpluses, and 
other sources, and between generations represent another avenue for funding 
old age needs. In Asia, South Korea, China and Singapore have been adept at 
using the SWFs to fund future expenditure needs, including those of the aged. 
Countries such as Malaysia may also consider this avenue for enhancing social 
protection spending.  
 Financial innovations, particularly at the pay-out phase, are accumulation 
schemes. The conventional practice of relying on annuities will be inadequate 
given limited financial instruments to mitigate longevity risk, and due to 
uncertainties in longevity trends due to uncertainties in medical technology 
breakthroughs. Such innovations, which reduce transaction costs of service 
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delivery and provide better risk sharing between the insurance company, the 
individual, and the government, will be needed.  Some high income countries 
have attempted to finance old age by developing instruments which convert 
real estate into a retirement consumption stream. They have had some success, 
but greater research and innovations in this area is essential for it to play a 
significant role. In developing Asia, individuals and households will need to 
bear a greater proportion of increased share devoted to old age financing. 
Promoting its secure and stable policy and regulatory environment for long 
term savings by the individuals should therefore be an important instrument for 
financing old age. But this needs to be undertaken without creating fiscal risks which 
ultimately must be borne by the citizens. 
3. Enhancing Professionalism 
 It is imperative that the five core functions of provident and pension funds 
must be done with greater professionalism than has been the case so far in many 
ASEAN economies10. This, in conjunction with strong regulation, would enable the 
ASEAN countries to provide much higher levels of pension benefits from lower 
contribution rates than is the case now. The focus of these organizations should be on 
providing benefits to their members, which are commensurate with the contribution 
rates and the transactions costs of administration and compliance.  
Some members such as Thailand and Malaysia have high administrative and 
compliance costs (Table 9). They have not been able to undertake record keeping and 
management information system tasks adequately, even for a relatively small 
proportion of the labour force comprising formal sector workers. Their plans to 
sharply expand the coverage to include informal sector workers may therefore be 
severely undermined by their inadequate record-keeping capabilities.  
                                                            
10 The core functions of any pension or provident fund may be stated as reliable collection of 
contribution/taxes and other receipts; payment of benefits for each of the schemes in a correct way; 
efficient financial management and productive investment of provident and pension fund assets; 
maintenance of an effective communication network, including development of accurate data and 
record-keeping mechanisms to support collection, payment and financial activities; and production of 
financial statements and reports which contribute to effective and reliable governance, fiduciary 
responsibility, transparency and accountability of old-age institutions (Ross, 2011). 
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Table 9: Administrative and Compliance Costs of Select Pension and Provident Fund 
Organizations in ASEAN 
  Source:  Asher and Bali, 2015.  
Investment policies and performance also remains a challenge in ASEAN. 
Limitations of domestic financial and capital markets, legal restrictions on 
international diversification (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia), and relatively low importance 
given to fiduciary responsibilities (which require maximizing returns of provident and 
pension fund balances for the benefit of the members) have contributed to this 
outcome.  
As pre-funding arrangements, through retirement savings or accumulation of 
reserves, become increasingly common (pension assets are expected to grow 
significantly in ASEAN countries), development of domestic financial and capital 
markets has become essential. Provident and pension funds will need to increasingly 
acquire competencies to deal with sophisticated investment strategies using diverse 
asset classes (e.g. debt, equity, real estate and currencies) and diverse players (such as 
hedge funds, private equity investors and sovereign wealth funds).  
Such sophisticated strategies however should not be attempted without 
adequate preparation; and without understanding downside risks. In many low and 
middle income countries, it may be prudent to not fully attempt to obtain upside 
potential from investments or from financial innovations such as credit-default risks, 
in order to minimize downside risks.  
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 There are four aspects of this perspective that need to be addressed. The first 
aspect involves complimentary reforms in other areas such as labour markets, fiscal 
policy and financial and capital markets are essential for effective for social security 
reform.  
Effective social security reform is greatly facilitated by sustainable macro-
economic policies which lead to high and stable growth whose benefits are distributed 
widely. This is because the single most important variable for the economic security 
of both the young and the old is the long term trend of economic growth. The labour 
market regulations and functioning must provide an appropriate balance between 
creating new jobs and preserving existing jobs. High employment is negatively 
correlated with poverty, and therefore creating economically viable and sustainable 
jobs is essential.  
Civil service pension reform should form a part of the fiscal policy reforms. 
These should be based on the full cost (including unfunded liabilities) of pension (and 
health) benefits being provided to the civil servants; and to improve the delivery of 
government services (including social assistance or social pensions for the elderly). 
Without full and explicit costing of civil service benefits, it would be difficult to 
allocate society’s resources devoted to the elderly equitably, and efficiently. In many 
countries, without civil service pension (and healthcare) reforms too large a share of 
national income devoted to all elderly will accrue to civil servants. This creates intra-
generational inequities, and may strain social cohesion. 
Financial and capital market reform is essential as the demand for quality 
investments by provident and pension funds should be matched by the corresponding 
supply of financial assets, based on both debt and equity. Unlocking the value of state 
enterprises through partial or full divestments will be an important avenue in many 
ASEAN countries for increasing the supply of such assets.   
The second aspect of the systemic perspective concerns the multi-tier 
framework to provide social security. While such a framework may have theoretical 
limitations (Barr and Diamond, 2008), it is essential for managing risks of financing 
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old age in any realistic political economy setting, particularly in ASEAN11. In a multi-
tier framework, different tiers provide a balance between social risk pooling and 
individuals bearing investment, longevity and other risks; between contributory and 
non-contributory schemes; and flexibility in managing and accessing retirement 
contributions or savings. The World Bank (2005) has suggested a five tier framework 
but it should be adapted to specific country needs and contexts.  
The relative weight of each tier however may vary from country to country. 
Initial conditions would have an important bearing on these weights. Thus, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam have pension (and health) systems based on 
social insurance principles (though coverage of population in each country is far from 
being universal). Malaysia has primarily relied on a single tier of mandatory savings, 
which is also used for housing and healthcare. Countries also need to expand their 
social assistance programmes, and introduce social insurance and solidarity principles 
into their pensions systems.  
These countries need to consider building other tiers, particularly social 
assistance (or social pension) type programmes financed from the budget, and 
individual retirement savings (Palacios and Sluchynsky, 2006). ASEAN countries 
such as Thailand and the Philippines have however found it difficult to implement 
individual retirement accounts, whether mandatory or on a voluntary basis. 
Developing robust annuity markets, which are particularly important for defined 
contribution pension systems, has been a major challenge.  
The main constraints arise due to limited investment instruments to manage 
longevity and inflation risks during the pay-out phase. Uncertainties about longevity 
trends are also a constraining factor, as these lead to conservative pricing of annuities, 
making them unattractive in comparison to other investments (and in some cases 
unaffordable, creating adverse selection problems). Therefore, greater attention will 
have to be given to the pay-out phase, including phased withdrawals, with some social 
risk pooling in the form of above-market interest rates, financed from the budget.  
Greater experimentation and research on group annuities phased withdrawal 
                                                            
11 Recent reforms in Chile which have considerably strengthened and widened the coverage of social 
pensions financed from the budget are instructive in this regard (Asher and Vasudevan, 2008). There 
has been growing interest in design and implementation of social pensions financed from the budget 
and in co contributing schemes involving pension savings by low income individuals which are 
matched by governments (Holzmann, D. Robalino,and N. Takayama, 2009) 
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programmes and other such instruments merits serious consideration as alternatives to 
individual purchase of annuities.  Lower fertility rates, urbanization, changing values 
and expectations of both the young and the old are significantly increasing the need 
for more formal pension systems in ASEAN, consistent with the experiences of 
current industrialized countries who faced these trends earlier.  
 Nevertheless, public policies in ASEAN should continue to promote 
traditional family oriented values and allocate requisite resources and energies 
towards this goal.  This is however unlikely to reverse the trend towards the need for 
more formal pension systems but it may reduce the rate of transition, and somewhat 
reduce the scope of the formal systems. 
It is also essential to recognize the importance of personal savings, home 
ownership, investing in human capital, including for children, and opportunities for 
participating in livelihood activities in old age as integral elements of any pension 
system. If their importance is reflected in tax, regulatory and government expenditure 
allocation decisions, these can play a useful supplementary role in addressing pension 
challenges. In some countries with well-developed micro-finance institutions, micro-
pensions could also play a useful role. 
It is important that policy makers enable households to utilize all the tiers, 
albeit to a varying extent, to obtain the required replacement rate for financial security 
in retirement. While the precise share cannot be prescribed a priori, both the policy 
makers and the households must consciously strive to make full use of all five tiers.  
Regardless of whether social security systems of a country is primarily based 
on social insurance and social solidarity principles or on individual and family 
responsibility, a significant proportion of retirement financing needs in the 21st 
century will have to be met from individual savings (Spivak, 2008). This strongly 
suggests that social norms and financial regulation should be so structured in a way 
that does not undermine thrift and saving habits. The credit culture must be kept in 
reasonable check lest it undermine household saving which is the main component of 
national saving in countries such as India.  It is also essential that the responsibilities 
of families and immediate communities taking care of the elderly are not too rapidly 
substituted by the state. This will require nurturing appropriate social norms and 
regulations.  
31 
The third aspect of the systemic perspective concerns public policies in 
ASEAN need to consider pension and health care financing arrangements in an 
integrated manner (Bali and Asher, 2011). As most healthcare services in ASEAN are 
paid for by Out of Pocket expenditure, it erodes the real value of pension benefits. 
Further, coordination between healthcare and pension policies can help better manage 
the total resource costs devoted to age related expenditure. A significant proportion of 
individuals above 80 years of age have difficulty performing daily functions. With 
decreased fertility and greater mobility, health care givers for the aged have become 
scarce. Developing countries such and Indonesia, Philippines and to a lesser extent 
Thailand also will also have to address the challenge of long-term care.   
The fourth aspect includes accounting and budgeting reforms, including 
procurement; and a move from accounting-based budgets to accrual-based budgets. 
This would enable governments to better manage their fiscal risks that stem from 
inadequate appreciation of current and future (including) contingent liabilities.  
5. Financial Education and Literacy 
 Provident and pension schemes require greater degree of financial education 
and literacy on the part of all the stakeholders, particularly individual members. The 
growing complexity of financial products and multiplicity of new financial players 
underscore the importance of financial education and literacy. Financial education and 
literacy should not be interpreted narrowly as only provident and pension funds in 
providing leadership and finances in designing and delivering these services to 
members. The lessons of financial education and literacy should be incorporated in 
the design and governance structures of the provident funds. This unfortunately is not 
the case with many provident funds in ASEAN. 
 ASEAN member countries need to make much more systematic efforts in 
promoting financial education. Such education is needed at all levels, general public, 
officials and trustees of provident and pension fund organizations, those involved in 
designing, marketing and advising of pension products, media and the policymakers. 
National campaigns for enhancing financial literacy will be needed, with a greater 
emphasis on literacy for government officials, trustees and management of social 
protection agencies. An important aspect of literacy in this regard concerns the need 
to impress on those involved in ASEAN economic initiatives do consider social 
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protection as an integral part of sustaining economic growth with social cohesion and 
not as an afterthought. Without such education which is effective in changing mind-
sets. ASEAN’s post-2015 vision of Social protection will be severely constrained. 
6. Indigenous Research Capability  
Member countries will need to substantially enhance their capacity to 
undertake rigorous empirical evidence based policy-relevant research on pensions and 
healthcare issues. This will require considerable strengthening of the existing database 
on morbidity and mortality patterns; and behaviour of individuals and firms 
concerning saving, and retirement. The challenges of ageing are too immense and 
complex to delay building such capacity, and not adopting a mind-set which translates 
research findings into timely policy measures. ASEAN countries may benefit from 
studying the experiences of the OECD countries, such as Sweden and Germany, and 
of Chile’s experience in encouraging a culture of solid analytical, policy-oriented 
indigenous research on pension issues and making available a robust database to 
undertake such research.   
Finally, consideration could be given to establishing a social protection forum 
at AEC level to discuss technical and other assistance for member states,. Such a 
forum should bring together not only public officials, but also other stakeholders such 
as trade unions, employer organizations, academics, researchers, and pension industry 
representatives. 
The ASEAN vision will require a construction of a robust social security 
system. To this extent each member will have to rely on a multi-tiered approach 
(Holzmann and Hitnz, 2005). The weight assigned to each of the tiers, and the 
organisational and institutional capacity required to support them will vary between 
member countries. To this extent, each country will have to develop its own 
financing-mix relying on multiple instruments. Relying on a blue print or a replicating 
a pension system from another economy will serve limited use.  
Concluding Remarks 
 The analysis in this paper suggests that ASEAN as an organization and its 
individual member countries may consider the following initiatives in progressing 
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towards its Socio-Cultural Community Vision 2025. These are broad initiatives under 
which countries can contextualize various sub-initiatives: 
1. Consider creating a ASEAN Social Protection Forum to enable development 
of a more robust database on social protection in ASEAN to undertake policy 
relevant research, to enable regular communication in exchange of ideas and 
information among all the stakeholders to provide technical and other 
assistance to members as needed. Such a forum should have adequate and 
secure funding, preferably from the member countries themselves; 
2. There must be a Cross- Border Worker Agreement which recognizes the social 
protection needs of these workers. Totalization agreements among ASEAN 
members involving formal social security programs, should also be 
encouraged; 
3. Consideration by each ASEAN member of how it can enhance 
professionalism in core function of its social protection systems and how it 
can incorporate systemic perspectives in social protection merits serious 
consideration; 
4. Initiatives policies to reduce expenditure needs of the elderly through 
productive ageing, and through a well-considered system of discounts for 
public amenities, such as transport, health care, utilities, etc. merits serious 
consideration. Such initiatives could also be considered at an ASEAN-wide 
level. 
5. There is merit in not separating the social sector in general, and social 
protection programmes in particular, from the ASEAN Economic Community 
deliberations. This is because increasingly without progress in social 
protection adequacy and coverage, essential reforms needed to sustain growth 
and economic restructuring while maintaining social cohesion is and will be 
progressively difficult. So compartmentalization and overwhelming priority of 
the economic aspects has become inappropriate in the current and foreseeable 
global economic, technological, and political environment.  
                 Post 2015, ASEAN should also consider reducing the reliance on 
donors for funding and for expertise, and create mechanisms for generating 
resources for progressing towards the social protection vision from sources 
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